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Abstract. The emergence of global networks also results in the occurrence of
systemic risks that might affect the stability of the overall system. To cope with
these risks, this workshop on the “Control of Systemic Risks in Global Networks”
provides a platform for the collection and discussion of innovative approaches,
methods, and theories but also of practical problems from the areas of simulation,
artificial intelligence, operations research, and statistics. This enables the
exchange of experiences and methods between scientists and practitioners.
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Introduction

Modern communication networks lead to a stronger coupling of and interdependency
between social and economic areas. Examples are electronic marketplaces, which
enable ever faster transactions, worldwide production networks, which allow for higher
specialization with increasing efficiency, and smart grids, which facilitate the provision
of energy in the European Single Market by means of flexible control. The resulting
worldwide and interconnected networks increasingly decide on the competitiveness of
enterprises.
On the one hand, this development is promoted by a strong demand pull for
innovative technologies that emanates from companies. This results from the
companies’ endeavor to take advantage of environmental differences in a “globalized
world”. Examples are increasing sales opportunities in emerging countries, low labor
costs, special competences in the development and production of electronic
components or software products, discoveries of raw materials, and tax conditions.
On the other hand, there is an increasing technology pressure. This is due to an
increasing performance-cost ratio of data management as well as from the fact that
modern multi and manycore systems accelerate or initially enable the solving of
sophisticated planning, disposition, and control algorithms. Moreover, the
advancement of traditional methods, e.g., artificial neural networks and deep learning,
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allows for the discovery of patterns and the investigation of systems that remained
hidden or were inaccessible before.
Along with these worldwide networks, systemic risks emerge which affect the
stability of the overall system [1]. Examples of potential failures are flash crashes in
high-frequency trading, production downtime due to delivery delays, or blackouts in
energy networks. For instance, on September 28th, 2003, power plant failures in Italy
lead to disruptions of the Internet infrastructure, which relied on energy supply and at
the same time was required to control other power plants. This resulted in a cascade of
failures and has nearly caused the collapse of the entire Italian energy supply [2,3].
Obviously, not all risks are equivalent with respect to their probability of occurrence
and of the consequences. Thus, those systemic risks must be identified, which – as
illustrated by the example – affect the stability of the overall system and are not
considered as part of the risk assessment of the independent subsystems. Here, the
extent of the risk must be considered as well as the probability of finding an adequate
countermeasure with reasonable effort.
In a joint initiative, which is steered by the German Informatics Society (Gesellschaft
für Informatik; GI), Information Systems Research and Computer Science have
selected the control of systemic risks in global networks as one of the five most
important Grand Challenges for the future [4]. From an information system research
perspective, two major interests can be identified: On the one hand, the availability as
well as the situational aggregation and interpretation of decision-relevant information
and on the other hand the autonomous identification, quantitative estimation, and
flexible reaction to risks.
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Current Technology Pressure

In information system as well as computer science research, there are ongoing
discussions whether networks can be designed or dynamically emerge from the
interaction of devices with network technologies: Worldwide networks are not designed
as part of an “engineering process”, they are created through the interaction of
interconnected systems as emergent phenomenon and must be described and
understood [5].
The need for a development of methods for the design of such networks can be
identified when investigating the current technology pressures. Developments that can
contribute to the control of systemic risks include but are not limited to:
1.

2.

Communication Networks: Advances in communication networks, e.g.,
an increasing performance-cost ratio of communication channels
(hardware) and greater flexibility in routing (software), which allow for
prioritized communication in case of emergency.
Simulation: Recent developments in simulation from a tool for planning
support to a real-time assistance for decision support through the
development of innovative formalisms, e.g., system dynamics or agentbased simulation, and due to the immediate availability of current data.
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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Machine Learning: Revolutionary progress in machine learning that is
facilitated by the increasing availability and amount of (training) data as
well as shift from multi to multi and manycore computing. This allows for
the use of deep learning, convolutional neural networks as well as data, text,
and opinion mining techniques.
Decentralized Control: The availability of approaches for decentralized
and adaptive control with autonomous software agents, multiagent systems,
and organic computing promotes the high-tech strategy “Industry 4.0”.
Transaction Processing Systems (Blockchain): New forms of transaction
processing systems, e.g., blockchain, allow for the tamper-resistant and
decentralized organization and logging of safety-critical operations in
processes such as access or updates of sensitive data.
Multilayer and Multiplex Networks: A shift from the analysis of isolated
and homogenous networks to the investigation of multilayer and multiplex
networks (interdependent networks).
Convergence: The convergence of technical systems and processes leads
to the unification of business models and technologies across sectors.
Through this, technical and economic success of one domain might
dominate another domain, e.g., successful business models of internet
giants can compete with stationary trade in the physical world even though
the horizon of experience is considerably lower.

Due to disciplinary barriers, the aforementioned technology areas are not yet
sufficiently developed, applied, or transferred for controlling systemic risks. This limits
the opportunities for action that can be undertaken to prevent the potentially dramatic
consequences of systemic risks. Still, these technologies have a high potential to
contribute as component of a solution for controlling systemic risks.
Considering disaster management strategies, for instance, it can be illustrated how
disciplines can learn from each other and benefit from the experiences of other
disciplines. Insurance companies make use of reinsurances to handle major claims
which could result in their insolvency. Such approaches are also applicable to supply
chain management as protection against supply shortages that might result in
disruptions of the own production of goods. In this regard, supply chain management
can also learn from insurances as systemic risks emerge from networks of reinsurances
which can potentially result in uncontrollable chain effects that lead to global crises.
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Reference Framework

Suitable technologies and methods for controlling systemic risks are diverse. Thus, to
classify and distinguish different approaches, we suggest the use of a morphological
box. It serves as a reference framework for discussion within the workshop as
approaches can be classified and assessed according to different dimensions. In Figure
1, the morphological box is illustrated that is used for the assessment of the approaches
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that are presented as part of this workshop. For each approach, the aspects of networks,
risks, and decision situation are focused.
To this end, the domain focus of the workshop lies on logistics, finance &
insurances, and public services, yet, also contributions from other domains are
welcome. With respect to the type of risk that is addressed by the approaches, it can be
differentiated into five types, according to the domain the risk is related to: production,
market, finance, institution, and nature. In addition, also the occurrence of the risk is
classified as regularly, periodically, or rarely. Finally, the decision situation of the risk
can be specified according to the risk’s predictability as well as by the authority which
is the decision maker.

Figure 1: Reference framework for the classification and discussion of approaches.
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Discussion

To address the Grand Challenge of controlling systemic risks in global networks,
this workshop aims at both the collection and discussion of innovative approaches,
methods, and theories but also practical problems from the areas of simulation, artificial
intelligence, operations research, and statistics. To this end, the goal of the workshop is
to provide a platform for the exchange of experiences and methods between scientists
and practitioners. Moreover, the development of a medium-term research agenda shall
be promoted for targeting this Grand Challenge.
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